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The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Senior Review Panel

NIC-00699-89  
23 June 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Senior Review Panel Comments on Draft  
SNIE 11-36-89: Monitoring Conventional  
Force Reductions, internally dated  
20 June 1989

1. The Panel believes that this timely draft exhaustively examines the manifold difficulties in monitoring, with a high degree of reliability, conventional force reductions in Europe. The text is clearly written and well organized. The graphics effectively emphasize the complexities and uncertainties inherent in establishing and operating successful monitoring programs. We have two sets of comments, one political and one technical; we recognize and accept that the present draft is intended as a technical paper for arms control specialists omitting reference to related political issues. Yet we are convinced that the latter simply cannot be ignored, and are of sufficient importance to deserve some attention. Ultimately, they should probably be more extensively analyzed in a companion estimate devoted to this equally critical dimension of the CFE negotiating process. We are unaware of any plans to do so at the present time.

2. Political Issues. As examples of what we consider an indispensable political context for a monitoring analysis, we cite:

a. The lengthy and ultimately unsuccessful MBFR negotiations which over some 14 years demonstrated the difficulty of reaching the essential prerequisite of agreed data bases for equipment and manpower. The present draft underlines again the complexities of reaching agreement even

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BY \_\_\_\_\_ Signers  
DATE \_\_\_\_\_ OADR  
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Monitoring Conventional Force Reduction

with our NATO allies (viz., paragraphs 26, et seq. and Table 3), let alone with the Warsaw Pact. Yet absent such preliminary agreements with both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, no CFE treaty is on the horizon, and the monitoring issue becomes moot. What are the prospects for reaching agreed data bases with NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the CFE context and how can they be structured to facilitate subsequent monitoring?

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c. The dilemma of insistence upon intrusive monitoring as one of the most effective techniques, especially in tracking compliance with manpower reductions, and the difficulty of reaching a NATO consensus on its extent and nature

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d. The latest US CFE proposals include both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.

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Policymakers will be looking for intelligence clues on how this issue might be resolved in the NATO context.

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
### 3. Technical Issues.

a. The draft SNIE alludes to the wide and growing variety of demands on US and Allied monitoring resources (viz., paragraphs 32, et seq. and Supplement A) deriving from past and ongoing disarmament negotiations, including START, SNF, INF, etc. Negotiators and policymakers will need to understand the capabilities and limitations of the current range of US monitoring and analytical resources in accomplishing the monitoring tasks inherent in any CFE treaty. It would be useful to set out (in an annex) the parameters of what additional collection and analytic resources might be required to achieve or significantly improve an acceptable level of US monitoring capabilities in the face of the many other demands on a finite number of assets.

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William Leonhart

John B. McPherson

Hugh Montgomery

John D. Wilson

cc: Chairman, NIC  
Vice Chairman, NIC  
NIO for General Purpose Forces